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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW
In recent years, the media department of the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State has proven itself to be highly adept at strategic communication. 
While much research has gone into the group’s digital and online 
capabilities, there remains a significant gap in the knowledge regard-
ing its in-country propaganda operations and objectives.
In recognition of this, the following research paper approaches the 
issue from a different angle, attempting to better understand how and 
why the group communicates its brand through the lens of two pub-
lications – al-Naba’, its Arabic-language newspaper, which appears 
to be designed primarily for offline dissemination in the caliphate 
itself, and Rumiyah, its foreign-language electronic magazine, which 
has only ever appeared online. Using content analysis to identify 
and compare each publication’s internal (local) and external (global) 
media priorities over the four-month period between September and 
December 2016, we develop an empirical evaluation of the group’s 
recent forays into targeted outreach.
KEY FINDINGS
The Islamic State’s publication priorities at the end of 2016 were 
largely bifurcated—its propagandists seemed to want different 
responses from different audiences, and Rumiyah and al-Naba’ were 
particularly demonstrative of this.
• Structurally, the publications bore only partial resemblance to 
each other, with Rumiyah privileging lengthier, more discursive 
ideological content and al-Naba’ primarily tending to preference 
briefer tactical news items.
• The publications were also distinct thematically: Rumiyah’s con-
tent was significantly more abstract – that is, weighted towards 
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complex political, social and theological issues – than that of 
al-Naba’, which shed much more light on present-day military 
matters than anything else. 
• Al-Naba’’s conception of jihad was distinctly more pragmatic 
than that of Rumiyah – it focused on real-world concerns rather 
than ideology, something that could point towards the differing 
motivations of the Islamic State’s in- and ex-theatre supporters. 
• There were significant geographic discrepancies between the two 
publications, with Rumiyah spending more time discussing events 
and operations external to Syria and Iraq than al-Naba’. This was 
most apparent in the context of the battle for Mosul, which was 
entirely absent from the pages of Rumiyah, and regularly front-
page news in al-Naba’.
• It appears that each publication was carefully tailored to suit its 
primary consumer audience – in Rumiyah’s case, this was the 
Islamic State’s diffuse archipelago of global supporters, and in the 
context of al-Naba’, this was, and continues to be, its in-country 
rank-and-file.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the media department of the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State has proven itself to be highly adept at target audience segmenta-
tion. Since 2013, its strategists have expertly manipulated their global 
consumers, steering public opinion and prompting the emergence 
of misconceptions that continue to hobble counter-extremism 
policymaking today. For example, while conventional wisdom often 
holds that Islamic State media revolves around brutality, and brutality 
alone, the violent films for which it is famous form just a tiny part of 
its overall propaganda output (Zelin 2015; Winter 2015; Milton 2016). 
This is far from the only mistake made about its approach to media 
operations; accompanying it is the unfounded assumption that its 
propaganda is uniquely geared towards radicalising and recruiting 
would-be foreign fighters and lone-actor terrorists from outside Syria 
and Iraq (Frampton et al. 2017; Macnair and Frank 2017). In reality, 
between 2014 and 2017, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s propagandists were 
just as concerned with attaining and retaining the acquiescence of 
the people over whom they presided as they were about recruiting 
from abroad. To this end, they used in-theatre information operations 
to substitute the dominant news agenda for their own and to paint 
a picture of a glorious – and pious – utopia. 
While it is possible to derive a very rough estimate of the 
caliphate’s local public diplomacy through secondhand reporting, 
the intricacies of these operations remain elusive. Moreover, 
the group’s Internet propaganda corpus, while abundant, cannot 
be used as a proxy for the totality of its local communications 
operations because it is not representative of the whole: tradi-
tional media products constitute but one portion of the organi-
sation’s overall propaganda arsenal. Besides conventional devices 
like video releases, audio bulletins, and written materials, it has 
also relied on performative propaganda – that is, things like public 
spectacles, interactions with roaming media officials, and sermons 
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in mosques – for offline influence operations in Syria, Iraq, 
and elsewhere, and there is no way to evaluate that through the 
use of open sources alone.
Recognising this, we approach the problem from a different 
angle, attempting to better understand how and why the Islamic 
State communicates in-theatre through the lens of two of its most 
important publications – al-Naba’, its Arabic-language newspaper, 
which appears to be designed primarily for offline dissemination in 
the caliphate itself, and Rumiyah, its foreign-language electronic mag-
azine, which has only ever appeared online. Using content analysis 
to identify and compare each publication’s internal (local) and 
external (global) media priorities over the four-month period between 
September and December 2016, we develop an empirical evaluation of 
how the group engages in target audience differentiation. Our analysis 
shows that, for all its attempts to appear monolithic, the operational 
essence of the caliphate varied according to location during the period 
in question: inside Iraq and Syria, it prioritised tactical, pragmatic, 
and integration-focused appeals over anything else, whereas, outside 
its ‘borders’, it was more conventionally terroristic in its outlook and 
operations, seeking instead to agitate, incite and instruct. 
The report begins with a brief overview of the academic literature 
on strategic communication and the Islamic State, in which we 
highlight the relative absence of scholarship exploring the offline 
dimension of its media operations. After that, we set out our data 
collection and coding methodology before presenting the findings 
of our analysis, which compares the two datasets along three axes: 
structure, theme, and geography. We conclude by discussing our 
findings and looking at the implications of this study for practitioners 
and researchers alike.
A TALE OF TWO CALIPHATES8
2.  LITERATURE 
REVIEW
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Since 2014, the Islamic State has faced unprecedented scrutiny 
from scholars, analysts, and journalists. Their accounts have focused 
on four areas – ideology, military tactics, external terrorism, and 
propaganda operations – the last of which we discuss in this brief 
review. Broadly speaking, the propaganda-focused literature is split 
between i) studies that examine online sympathiser communities 
and social networks; ii) archival studies that use thematic analysis 
to dissect the Islamic State’s meta-narrative; and iii) studies that use 
content analysis to decipher specific propaganda genres, motifs, 
and media products. 
In the context of the first cluster, which is focused on mapping 
social networks and dynamics, work by Carter et al. (2014), Klausen 
(2015), Berger and Morgan (2015) and Conway et al. (2017) has been 
particularly influential. Based on their studies, consensus has 
emerged that the Islamic State’s online ecosystem is nebulous and 
ever-reconfiguring, and that, crucially, only a tiny minority of its 
Internet cheerleaders are likely to engage in terrorism-related activ-
ities. Further informed by contributions from Amarasingam (2015) 
and Stalinsky and Sosnow (2017), it has been made clear that the 
online Islamic State community is at once hierarchical and diffuse, 
and largely reliant on a strong sense of communal identity. While 
it is not ‘responsible’ for this dynamic, the Islamic State’s official 
propaganda appears to serve as an ideological glue keeping this fluid 
network of networks together.
The second cluster – thematic explorations of the Islamic State 
narrative – is characterised by a handful of archive-based analyses. 
Zelin (2015) was the first to empirically evaluate the group’s jihadist 
promise. Using a one-week snapshot of its media output collected 
from Twitter, he sets out the parameters of its appeal, demonstrating 
that its brand was not as monochromatic as much of the media 
coverage at the time of his data collection suggested. His exploration 
was added to by Winter (2015), who, in his analysis of the Islamic 
State media products gathered in the summer of 2015, comes to 
a comparable set of conclusions. Similarly, Milton (2016), who exam-
ines official visual media products released over the twenty months 
between January 2015 and August 2016, finds that the caliphate’s 
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strategic narrative has long comprised more than war and brutality. 
He also notes that its communication operations contracted between 
2014 and 2016, a finding that was corroborated by Conway et al. (2017) 
and Winter (2018), not to mention BBC Monitoring (2017) and the 
Global Coalition (2017). 
The third cluster, which comprises multimodal explorations 
of individual media genres and products, builds on these broader 
works. Chouliaraki and Kissas (2018) take an aesthetic approach to 
categorising the appearance of violence in the Islamic State video 
propaganda, whereas Macnair and Frank (2017) use thematic analysis 
to decipher cultural meaning in AlHayat Media Center films. In each 
case, they are struck by the influence of Western motifs, both cultural 
and stylistic, a remark also made by Winkler et al. in their analysis 
of Dabiq – the organisation’s English-language magazine – which is, 
in their view, a ‘high-profile example of the medium of terrorism’ 
(Winkler et al. 2016). For his part, Ingram (2016; 2017; 2018) has 
provided a number of excellent contributions to this part of the 
literature, among them a close content analysis of Dabiq, a compar-
ative study between Dabiq and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s 
Inspire magazine, and an evaluation of Dabiq and Rumiyah’s evolu-
tion between 2014 and 2017. Wignell et al. (2017) and Wignell, Tan 
and O’Halloran (2017) also adopt a longitudinal approach, examining 
aesthetic and thematic shifts in the Islamic State’s English-language 
literary output since 2014. Focusing instead on French-language 
propaganda, Benraad (2017) and Roy (2017) use a close reading of the 
French-language magazine Dar al-Islam to decrypt how it constructs 
appeal among Muslims, again focusing on Western countries. Benraad 
argues that, on balance, its media output reflects European society 
more than anything else, framing Islam as a reaction to modernity. 
For his part, Roy also notes that its discourse is largely calibrated 
towards Westerners; he contends that Islamic religiosity is merely 
‘incantatory’ to the organisation – that is, it is window dressing for 
a movement built on nihilist radicalism (Roy 2017, p. 44).
To sum up, while explorations of how the Islamic State positions 
itself globally abound, the local, in-theatre level is largely excluded 
in the academic literature. We therefore have little awareness of how 
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the caliphate idea has resonated inside Syria and Iraq. Only 
Stalinsky (2015) and Winter (2018), with their works on the 
Islamic State’s domestic media dissemination infrastructure, 
and Winkler et al. (2016), with her brief visual analysis of 
internal and external infographics, investigate this aspect 
of the equation. Building on their efforts, this report seeks 
to enhance our understanding of the Islamic State’s strategic 
communication operations, positing that the group com-
municates different things to different people depending on 
whether they are friends or enemies, and whether they are 
inside or outside its claimed territories.
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3.  METHODOLOGY
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Our research design was developed on the basis that the Islamic 
State is a hybrid organisation which, as a result of situational 
exigency, ‘must accomplish multiple objectives simultaneously’ 
(Winkler et al. 2016, p.15). Hence, it is safe to assume that ‘the group’s 
producers purposefully craft their messages to reach intended target 
audiences’ and that most, if not all, of its propaganda products have 
(at least) primary, secondary, and tertiary consumers (Winkler et al. 
2016, p.15). Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in the context 
of its written materials – specifically, its magazine Rumiyah and its 
newspaper al-Naba’ – the first of which, we contend, is principally 
geared towards a territorially external audience, and the second of 
which is primarily calibrated at the local level. Before describing the 
methodology we used to decipher the priorities of each publication, 
it is first necessary to discuss their origins and positioning.
3.1 RUMIYAH 
Rumiyah is the Islamic State’s electronic magazine. In total, thirteen 
issues of it were released online between September 2016 and 
September 2017, when it went out of regular circulation. Its name, 
which refers to the city of Rome, echoes a speech made by a former 
leader of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in which 
he states that ‘we [ISI] will not rest from our jihad except beneath the 
olive trees of Rumiyah’, an eschatological reference intended to demar-
cate his group’s strategic ambitions.1 According to an article published 
in both Rumiyah and al-Naba’ in early 2017, the magazine was the joint 
brainchild of United States-born propagandist Ahmad Abousamra, 
and Abu Muhammad al-Furqan, the late-Islamic State information 
minister.2 Its goal was ‘to expand the Islamic State’s reach by releasing 
1 This quotation appears on the first or second page of each issue of Rumiyah.
2 Islamic State, 2017. ‘Among the believers are men: Shaykh Abu Sulayman 
ash-Shami’. Rumiyah 8, AlHayat Media Center, April, pp. 40–45; Islamic 
State, 2017. ‘Abu Sulayman ash-Shami (may God rest his soul): between 
a desire for martyrdom and the obliteration of idols’. Naba’ 75, Central 
Media Diwan, April, pp. 12–13.
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one magazine in several languages, with each language’s version being 
periodically released at the same time’.3 While its structure and intent 
may have been carefully devised, the intricacies of its appearance 
and branding were likely to be a partial response to the organisation’s 
shifting territorial circumstances (Wignell et al. 2017). When it was 
first published in September 2016, the group was on the cusp of defeat 
to Turkey-backed rebels in the Syrian town of Dabiq, the former 
namesake of its English-language magazine. Rumiyah’s appearance 
on the scene thus came as an uncannily lucky reprieve for the group’s 
propagandists – had they left Dabiq magazine as it was, they would 
have risked continually reminding their various readerships of the 
Islamic State’s failed apocalyptic promise. 
At its peak, Rumiyah was simultaneously published on a monthly 
basis in eleven languages – English, French, German, Russian, 
Turkish, Urdu, Uyghur, Pashtu, Indonesian, Kurdish, and Bosnian. 
It varied in length, but was usually between thirty-five and fifty pages 
long, and its content – which was, barring a few notable differences, 
consistent across each language’s edition – was highly varied, visually 
dynamic, and editorially sophisticated (Wignell et al. 2017). By the 
autumn of 2017, it had become apparent that those in charge of pro-
ducing it were struggling – its quality had diminished linguistically, 
thematically, and visually. No new issues have been released since the 
autumn of 2017. Crucially, Rumiyah only ever appears to have been 
disseminated online: no evidence has emerged to suggest that it was 
ever printed or disseminated internally by the Islamic State, and there 
is usually ample documentation of this kind of activity (Winter 2018).
3.2 AL-NABA’
Al-Naba’ is the Islamic State’s official newspaper. While it is also 
published online, its primary audience, at least between 2015 and 
2018, appears to have been civilians and combatants living inside the 
group’s territories in Syria and Iraq. As attested to by more than one 
3  Islamic State, 2017, ‘Among the believers are men’, p. 45.
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hundred official propaganda photographs released since 2015 docu-
menting its in-theatre distribution, it is regularly disseminated offline 
in print, sometimes prior to being published online.
The Islamic State, ‘Distributing pamphlets and al-Naba’ newspaper in the 
village of al-Fadiliyyah’, Ninawa Province Media Office, 7 February 2016.
 
The Islamic State, ‘Distributing the weekly al-Naba’ newspaper in the city of
Tal’afar’, Jazirah Province Media Office, 14 March 2017. 
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The Islamic State, ‘Aspect of the distribution of al-Naba’ newspaper in the 
province’, Furat Province Media Office, 1 March 2018.
Having entered into regular circulation in its current manifestation in 
2015 – offline from July (the first few issues were not numbered) and 
online since December – al-Naba’ was, by the second week of June 
2018, on its 135th edition. Apart from just three occasions, it has 
emerged like clockwork every week for more than two-and-a-half 
years. Al-Naba’’s structure and form are meticulously consistent: 
for the most part written in standardised media Arabic, it always 
features a combination of short and long articles with two full-page 
infographics. Up until the 104th edition, it was sixteen pages long; 
subsequently, though, it was shortened to twelve pages. 
Al-Naba’ has existed in various forms since 2010, when it was 
first introduced by ISI, the Islamic State’s predecessor.4 Initially, 
it §was merely a loose collection of statements and news items pub-
lished on an irregular basis. In 2011, though, it began to be circulated 
on a monthly basis. The following year, it was released as a 410-page 
report containing information on just over 4,500 ISI military oper-
ations. By 2013, after ISI had rebranded as the Islamic State in Iraq 
and ash-Sham (ISIS), its remit was expanded to include operational 
information on Syria as well as Iraq, and, in 2014, it began to emerge 
4  Islamic State, 2015. ‘Naba’: the most important periods in the story of its 
development’. Naba’ 1, Central Media Diwan, October, p. 2.
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on a fortnightly basis. It was not until 2015 that it appeared in its 
current newspaper format, containing photographs, announcements, 
promotions, military updates, and political essays. Today, it has both 
offline and online audiences (Winter 2018). However, given its history 
and evolution, which predominantly sees it as a paper publication 
physically disseminated in-theatre, there can be little doubt that its 
primary readership is the internal, local one. This makes al-Naba’ one 
of very few publicly available sources providing researchers with 
insight into the Islamic State’s offline messaging strategy.
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4.  CONTENT 
ANALYSIS
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To compare the two publications, we limited our analysis to 
the four-month period between September and December 2016. 
During this time, we downloaded all four issues of Rumiyah in all its 
languages and all sixteen editions of al-Naba’ on the day of or day 
after their release. This particular timeframe was chosen because it 
allowed us to examine and compare the publications at a time of pro-
found organisational change for the group. As well as the impending 
loss of the town of Dabiq at the time, it had just lost two of its most 
senior media strategists – the official spokesman, Abu Muhammad 
al-‘Adnani, and the aforementioned information minister, al-Furqan. 
Moreover, two weeks after the second issue of Rumiyah came out, 
the offensive to recapture the city of Mosul was initiated by the 
Iraqi government and its allies. By focusing our efforts on these four 
months, we were thus able to empirically evaluate the theory that the 
loss of al-‘Adnani and al-Furqan, the fall of Dabiq, and the onset of the 
battle for Mosul were a turning point in the Islamic State’s strategic 
communication priorities (Gambhir 2016; Kadercan 2017; Lister 2017). 
Confining our study to these four months also meant that we could 
study how each publication reported on the same ‘big’ stories. 
A comparison of the English-, French-, German- and Russian-
language editions of Rumiyah revealed some discrepancies in content 
and structure. For example, some editions were occasionally found 
to contain content that was ‘exclusive’ to their specific linguistic 
audience. For the purpose of this project, though, we decided to refer 
only to the English-language version of the magazine. An in-depth 
analysis of it and the other-language editions will be covered in 
a future publication as a follow-up to this study. 
Having compiled the two sets of publications, we needed to break 
them up into their smallest units of analysis. Rather than comparing 
them on a word-for-word basis, we opted to examine them based on 
distinct editorial ‘events’ – that is, individual articles, reports, inter-
views, and infographics. In total, there were seventy-three separate 
editorial events in the Rumiyah corpus (an average of eighteen in 
each edition) and 463 in al-Naba’ (an average of twenty-nine in each 
issue). Images were not regarded as unique editorial events because, 
in almost all cases, they were featured as supporting evidence rather 
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than as singular media events. While it would be possible – desirable, 
even – to use multimodal visual analysis to unlock their implicit 
meanings, as Winkler et al. (2016) did in the context of Dabiq, doing 
so is beyond the scope of this particular project. 
Each editorial event was coded according to its structural, 
thematic and geographic characteristics. The structural analysis was 
straightforward: items were classed according to form. In determining 
the thematic priorities of each event, we were guided by a close 
reading of the content and headline in question. The geographic 
analysis required examining each event with a view to tagging it with 
a code denoting the primary location to which it referred. If this was 
not possible, events were assigned the code ‘Central’. We examined 
each event in isolation and implemented inter-coder reliability checks 
throughout the analysis: besides the authors of this paper, two other 
Arabic-speakers familiar with the jihadist lexicon were brought on to 
check both the coding schemata and its application. In all but sixteen 
cases, the two corpuses were coded consistently. The remaining 
sixteen were reconciled through discussion.
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5.  FINDINGS
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As mentioned, our analysis operates along three axes: first, 
we examine the editorial structure of each publication; second, 
we explore their thematic priorities; and third, we investigate the 
geographic distribution of their content.
5.1 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
The content of both Rumiyah and al-Naba’ ranged from short 
reports on military affairs to long accounts of early Islam and 
detailed essays about the role of women in ‘Islamic’ society. Much 
of the time, longer-form content appeared in translation in both 
Rumiyah and al-Naba’. After breaking each corpus down into 
editorial events, five distinct content types were immediately 
discernible – in alphabetical order: 
1. Essays: Articles ranging from one to five pages in length that 
dealt with anything from military affairs and ideological matters 
to theological issues and eulogies of Islamic State ‘heroes’. Essays 
appeared throughout Rumiyah, whereas in al-Naba’, they were 
usually found on the third, ninth, fourteenth, and fifteenth pages.
2. Infographics: Colourful visualisations of operational data, 
religious advice, and logistical instructions. To borrow Adelman’s 
(2018) words, they ‘make voluminous data about complex social, 
cultural, and political phenomena accessible by condensing it 
and organising it into a comprehensible and digestible visual 
narrative’. Full-page infographics appeared at random in 
Rumiyah, whereas they were always featured on the second and 
last pages of al-Naba’.
3. Interviews: Transcripts of conversations with officials from the 
Islamic State. While they were rare in both publications, inter-
views were particularly rich content, and focused on anything 
from military matters (specifically, in this case, the defence 
of Mosul) to religious governance (like, for example, religious 
policing in Sinai Province).  
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4. News reports: Short, current affairs briefs referring to specific 
events or developments either inside or outside the Islamic State. 
They were published individually in al-Naba’ on a tactical basis, 
and as collections in Rumiyah on a more strategic basis. They 
pertained, almost uniquely, to military matters. 
5. Speech transcripts: Statements from past and present Islamic 
State leaders. They appeared irregularly in each publication, either 
on an ad hoc basis after an official statement had been published 
or in order to delineate a desired response to a particular strategic 
challenge. 
The Rumiyah corpus mainly comprised essays (47%) and infographics 
(40%). The remainder was made up of collections of news reports 
(5%), speech transcripts (5%), and interviews (3%). Its content was 
less factual than it was discussion-, argument- and opinion-based, 
a quality to which its glossy visual style corresponded. Judging by its 
form, Rumiyah appears to have be structured according to Western 
magazine editorial customs.
Figure 1. Content type
Al-Naba’, on the other hand, appears to have been structured 
to resemble a traditional Arabic-language newspaper. It primarily 
consisted of news reports (70%), with the remainder being made 
up of essays (17%), infographics (11%), interviews (1%), and speech 
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transcripts (1%). It contained relatively few images compared to 
Rumiyah and had, in general, a less sophisticated visual grammar.
Based on their respective structures, it is possible to infer a num-
ber of things about what Rumiyah and al-Naba’ are intended to do. 
Rumiyah, which is characterised by lengthier, discursive content, 
performs a near-identical function to its predecessor, Dabiq – that 
is, it privileges conceptual content over current affairs and serves as 
a strategic repository for situating day-to-day news within the broader 
history and evolution of the Islamic State movement. By way of contrast, 
al-Naba’, which is more concise, regular and immediate in its editorial 
outlook, appears to be aimed at providing a more tactical commentary 
of matters pertaining to the group’s present-day existence. Besides these 
structural discrepancies, our analysis also shows that much of the longer-
form content is shared between each publication, further supporting the 
idea that these are substitute, not complementary, goods.
5.2 THEMATIC ANALYSIS
For this portion of the analysis, we separated Rumiyah and al-Naba’s 
editorial events into two groups: military and non-military. Events 
that fell into the former category alluded to specific aspects of the 
Islamic State’s war effort, dealing with anything from current military 
affairs to defensive tactics. Events that fell into the latter category 
either did not mention the Islamic State’s war effort at all or alluded 
to it only at a highly general and strategic level.
Figure 2. Rumiyah and al-Naba’ content analysis
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5.2.1 Military content
Military events in each corpus were assigned one of seven codes – 
in alphabetical order: 
1. Operations (terrorist): News reports providing details of Islamic 
State terrorist attacks. We define terrorism according to the defi-
nition adopted by the United States Department of State – that is, 
‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents’ (US Department of State 2006). For that reason, only news 
reports regarding attacks against civilian targets were included in 
this category.
2. Operations (defensive): News reports detailing the use of defen-
sive tactics. Reports that specifically speak of counter-attacks, 
anti-aircraft facilities, and operations in which an encroaching 
enemy is repelled were included in this category. 
3. Operations (covert): News reports detailing the use of guerrilla 
tactics against military targets. Operations involving hidden impro-
vised explosive devices, assassinations, booby-trapped houses, and 
infiltrative suicide tactics were included in this category. 
4. Operations (offensive): News reports detailing the use of con-
ventional aggressive tactics. Reports on regular clashes, shaping 
operations, tactical raids, and strategic advances were included in 
this category.
5. Military positioning: Essays setting out the tactical and 
strategic agenda of the Islamic State’s military effort. Items that 
explicitly refer to military tactics and strategic provisions were 
included here, but items that referred to the war effort more 
generally as part of a broader ideological discussion were not. 
6. Tactics and incitement: Essays giving advice on how and why to 
perpetrate acts of terrorism outside Syria and Iraq. This category 
included theological arguments as to the necessity of killing 
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non-Muslim civilians and explicit discussions about and instruc-
tions for the use of specific tactics. 
7. Military statistics: Infographics providing aggregated figures for 
tactical and strategic military operations.
A total of 40% of the Rumiyah corpus focused on military issues. 
Figure 3. Military content
The subcategory that most 
frequently appeared was military 
statistics (18%).5 Most of the time, 
these events were infographics 
relating information about the 
Islamic State’s conventional 
military operations, though 
two focused specifically on its 
use of terrorism in Iraq and 
Bangladesh.6 At 7% of the 
Rumiyah corpus, the next most 
5 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘The epic battles of Sirte’. Rumiyah 4, 
December, p. 13; Islamic State, 2017. ‘Results of the military operations in 
Khurasan wilayah’. Rumiyah 4, December, p. 19.
6 Islamic State, 2017. ‘Operations in Bengal’. Rumiyah 2, October, p. 7; Islamic 
State, 2017. ‘Baghdad harvest’. Rumiyah 2, October, p. 34.
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Figure 4. Breakdown of military
content in Rumiyah
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recurrent subcategory was military positioning. Besides an essay 
about a terrorist attack against the Kenyan police and an interview 
with the ‘governor’ of the Islamic State’s Tripoli Province, these items 
mainly comprised ‘best of’ collections of news reports relating to the 
previous month’s military activities.7 In the news report subsection, 
31% of references were to terrorist operations, whereas 30% related to 
defensive operations, 28% to covert operations, and 11% to offensive 
operations. There is further analysis of the geographic distribution of 
these reports in the next section. The remainder of the Rumiyah cor-
pus’s military content comprised tactics and incitement events, 
which included instructions on how to perpetrate knife and vehicular 
attacks as well as long-winded theological accounts encouraging 
brutal and indiscriminate violence against non-Muslims.8 
In contrast to Rumiyah, the majority of the al-Naba’ corpus 
was military in nature (79%). The largest proportion of this 
content – nine tenths of which was made up of individual news 
reports – focused on offensive operations (36%), with the remainder 
reporting on covert operations 
(13%), defensive operations 
(11%), and terrorist operations 
(9%). Four percent of the corpus 
comprised military statistics, 
while another 4% consisted of 
military positioning.9 While it 
was, proportionally speak-
ing, rare, al-Naba’’s military 
7 Islamic State, 2017. ‘Interview with the wali of Tarabulus’. Rumiyah 4, 
December, pp. 10-13; Islamic State, 2017, ‘Military operations’. Rumiyah 1, 
September, pp. 22-26; Islamic State, 2017. ‘Military and covert operations’. 
Rumiyah 4, December, pp. 34–37. 
8 Islamic State, 2016. ‘Just terror tactics – part 2’. Rumiyah 3, November, 
pp. 10-12; Islamic State, 2016. ‘Just terror tactics’. Rumiyah 2, October, 
pp. 12–13; Islamic State, 2016. ‘The kafir’s blood is halal for you, so shed it’. 
Rumiyah 3, November, pp. 34–36.
9 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘The battles in the environs of Tadmur’. 
Naba’ 46, September, p. 2; Islamic State, 2016. ‘Hunting the sahwat’. Naba’ 
50, October, p. 12.
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Figure 5. Breakdown of military
content in al-Naba’
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positioning content was particularly interesting. It featured essays and 
interviews relating primarily to defensive operations in and around 
Aleppo, the Qalamun Mountains, and Mosul. These accounts were 
surprisingly candid in their discussion of operational preparation and 
strategic priorities, and were seemingly geared towards buoying morale 
among the newspaper’s readership.10 Less than half of one percent of 
content dealt with tactics and incitement – specifically, this refers to 
two essays on the use of brutality against non-Muslims, which also 
appeared in Rumiyah.11
One of the most noteworthy distinctions between Rumiyah and 
al-Naba’ is in regard to their respective coverage of the battle for 
Mosul, which was, as already mentioned, launched in October 2016. 
In Rumiyah, aside from a single infographic published in December, 
the city was not mentioned even once, even in the news reports 
section.12 In al-Naba’, on the other hand, it was front-page news 
nine weeks in a row, and content pertaining to it made up 17% of the 
entire corpus. That the most important battle in the Islamic State’s 
history to date was totally ignored by Rumiyah but thoroughly 
covered in al-Naba’ indicates the divergent editorial priorities of the 
two publications.
Putting the specific case of Mosul to one side, though, there are 
multiple other distinctions between Rumiyah and al-Naba’ when it 
comes to military content. For the former, military events tended 
to emphasise the ideological nature of the Islamic State war and 
reiterate the transnational reach of its cadres. This content was 
strategic in its orientation, geared more towards encouraging and 
facilitating the Islamic State’s war than repositioning its territorial 
10 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘The apostates will see what the mujahidin 
have prepared for them after the failure of their campaign in Mosul’. Naba’ 
55, November, pp. 8–9.
11 Islamic State, 2017. ‘Aggression and brutality against the kuffar in the sirah 
of the Prophet al-Mukhtar, peace be upon him’. Naba’ 46, September, p. 13; 
Islamic State, 2017. ‘Aggression and brutality against the kuffar in the sirah 
of the Rightly Guided Caliphs’. Naba’ 47, September, p. 12.
12 Islamic State, 2017. ‘Some losses of the murtaddin in the battle of Mosul’. 
Rumiyah 4, December, p. 38. 
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losses. The issue of defeat was usually avoided entirely. However, 
when that was not possible – for example, in the wake of its defeat 
in Sirte and, the following year, Mosul – it turned to eschatology, 
framing any such losses as malahim, episodes in the age-old war 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. A quintessential example of 
this came after the recapture of Dabiq, when Rumiyah featured 
an article conceding the loss as a tactical defeat while at the same 
time repositioning it as a necessary step towards the apocalypse – 
and, hence, a sign of the inevitability of ultimate victory in the war 
against the enemies of Islam. Through rhetorical tools like these, 
Rumiyah’s editors strove to deprive the Islamic State’s war of its 
temporality. By way of contrast, al-Naba’ was significantly more 
tactical in its outlook. Its primary focus was on reframing day-to-
day events – both defeats and victories – as logical progressions in 
the caliphate’s insurgent project. While it was by no means void of 
ideological content, the newspaper was weighed down with news 
reports aimed at cumulatively repositioning the Islamic State’s 
military prospects in order to boost morale and maintain a sense 
of momentum among the readership. Losses, encroachments and 
infringements were almost always reframed through hyperactive 
reporting and tactical denialism. 
5.2.2 Non-military content
Non-military editorial events were assigned one of ten codes:
1. Victimhood: News reports detailing the loss of civilian life and 
damage to civilian infrastructure inside the Islamic State. 
2. History: Essays providing accounts of historic events deemed 
important by the Islamic State. Usually, these items conveyed an 
idealised representation of the Golden Age of Islam that conforms 
to the Islamic State’s particular mode of government. 
3. Governance: Infographics and interviews highlighting specific 
aspects of the caliphate’s civilian bureaucracy. These ranged 
from accounts of education provision in Syria to religious 
policing in Egypt.
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4. Women: Essays orientated towards female readers. They tended to 
deal with civilian matters and were usually instructional in their tone.
5. Promotion: Infographics advertising video releases from the 
Islamic State’s official media offices.
6. Eulogy: Essays and infographics providing detailed biographical 
accounts of prominent martyrs. Some focused on deceased 
Islamic State leaders, whereas others told the story of ‘regular’ 
foreign fighters.
7. Operational advice: Essays – and, although there were none 
in either of our four-month corpuses, infographics – providing 
information on personal security. 
8. Theological legitimacy: Essays on matters of jurisprudence 
through which the Islamic State attempted to assert its 
religious credentials. 
9. Ideological positioning: Essays, interviews, and speech tran-
scripts that positioned the organisation ideologically. These items 
took pride of place in both al-Naba’ and Rumiyah. 
10. Religious texts and advice: Infographics and essays focusing 
on specific matters in religion, often advising readers on how 
to become ‘better’ Muslims during times of war.
Figure 6. Non-military content
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No less than 60% of Rumiyah’s content fell into the non-military 
category. The largest proportion comprised religious advice 
(21%) – primarily infographics about prayer and fasting.13 
Ideological positioning accounted for 15%. These events included 
long-winded essays deriding the Islamic State’s enemies and 
undermining the legitimacy of its rivals, as well as articles setting 
out the parameters of its strategic vision.14 Emphasising that any 
difficulties it faced were but transient episodes in its inevitably 
successful jihadist project, these events were seemingly intended 
to counter the narrative that the Islamic State was existentially 
challenged. Some 12% of the events focused on theological 
legitimacy, which involved anything from intellectual attacks 
against non-Islamic State religious scholars to detailed discussions 
around matters like takfir, jama’ah, and riddah.15 The remaining 
non-military items were coded as eulogy (7%), promotion (5%), 
women (5%), governance (1%), and history (1%). The eulogy 
events lionised al-‘Adnani and al-Furqan and celebrated the 
deaths of prominent foreign fighters and terrorists, whereas the 
women-orientated items comprised prescriptive accounts of how 
female Muslims should behave, emphasising, over the four months 
in question, the need to give to charity, morally support fighters, 
and remain in their homes.16
In contrast to Rumiyah, only 21% of the al-Naba’ corpus 
was non-military. At 6% of the total number of editorial events, 
13 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘Dhikr’. Rumiyah 4, December, p. 27.
14 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘The weakest house is that of a spider’. 
Rumiyah 3, November, pp. 2-3.
15 Islamic State, 2013. ‘The obligation of exposing wicked scholars’. Rumiyah 
3, November, pp. 28-30; Islamic State, 2017. ‘The religion of Islam and the 
jama’ah of the Muslims – part 1 and 2’. Rumiyah 1, September, pp. 4-8.
16 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘The shuhuda’ of Gulshan’. Rumiyah 2, 
October, pp. 8-11; Islamic State, 2017. ‘O women, give charity’. Rumiyah 1, 
September, pp. 18-20; Islamic State, 2017. ‘Stories of steadfastness from the 
lives of the sahabiyyat’. Rumiyah 2, October, pp. 28-30; Islamic State, 2017. 
‘Abide in your homes’. Rumiyah 3, November, pp. 40-41; Islamic State, 2017. 
‘Marrying widows is an established Sunnah’. Rumiyah 4, December, pp. 
32-33. 
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ideological positioning articles were the most prominent of the 
newspaper’s non-military content. Among other things, these 
materials included attacks against the Turkish government, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian Opposition, as well 
as a series of editorial-style articles that resituated the previ-
ous week’s events in the broader context of the Islamic State 
jihad.17 Religious texts and advice appeared 4% of the time, with 
theological legitimacy materials occurring just 3% of the time. 
While they were proportionally less regular in the al-Naba’ 
dataset, the eulogy-, women- and governance-orientated materials 
(each of which made up 2% of the corpus) performed a similar, 
albeit diluted, function to those in Rumiyah – indeed, many 
of them were straight translations that also appeared in the course 
of its pages. The final 3% was split between propaganda promotion 
and history, along with a single victimhood-themed news report 
about American airstrikes in Sirte.18
As the above analysis shows, the two publications differed signifi-
cantly when it came to non-military content. Proportionally speaking, 
there was much more of it in Rumiyah, which meant significantly 
more time spent on theological, ideological and civilian issues. 
It seems that, in Rumiyah, the Islamic State was more preoccupied 
with setting out the parameters of its ideology and making theological 
arguments to legitimise its existence and actions than anything else. 
In al-Naba’, on the other hand, much of this was already taken for 
granted. Indeed, in general, its editors appeared less concerned with 
abstract content aimed at positioning jihad in the minds of their read-
ership. To be sure, religious argument and ideological discussion were 
important foundations to al-Naba’, but this material always played 
second fiddle to its continuous stream of military-focused reportage.
17 For example: Islamic State, 2017. ‘So kill the mushrikin wherever you 
find them’. Naba’ 48, September, p. 3; Islamic State, 2017. ‘Be patient, o 
mujahidin’. Naba’ 49, October, p. 3.
18 Islamic State, 2017. ‘American planes increases their bombardment after 
the failure of the Unity Government to win the battle of Sirte’. Naba’ 50, 
October, p. 6.
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5.3 GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
For this portion of the analysis, we focused only on news reports 
in each publication. This involved geographically tagging each of 
al-Naba’’s articles, and dissecting and tagging Rumiyah’s opera-
tional digest collections. The locational tags were arranged into 
three categories derived from leaked Islamic State legislative 
documents: 
1. Home wilayat (provincial affiliates): Relating to events or 
developments taking place inside or on the ‘borders’ of one of the 
Islamic State’s provinces in Iraq or Syria.
2. Distant wilayat: Relating to events or developments taking place 
inside or on the ‘borders’ of one of the Islamic State’s provinces 
in Algeria, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Egypt (the Sinai Peninsula 
only), Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan or Yemen.19 
3. External territories: Relating to events or developments taking 
place outside the Islamic State’s home or distant wilayat. This 
category is primarily related to covert and terrorist operations in 
places such as Bangladesh and Somalia, but also includes news 
reports about mainland Egypt, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, 
and the United States.
Of Rumiyah’s news reports, 55% related to operations in the Islamic 
State’s home wilayat. Most of these items focused on conventional 
and covert military operations. The remaining 45% of its news 
reports were split between the distant wilayat (18%) and external ter-
ritories (28%). That nearly half of all of Rumiyah’s operational digests 
were devoted to events taking place outside Syria and Iraq suggests 
that its editors were proactively trying to emphasise the international 
nature of the caliphate, perhaps hoping to demonstrate that it was 
19  The distinction between Home and Distant Wilayat corresponds to the 
Islamic State’s organisational oversight of its Syria- and Iraq-based 
affiliates compared with those elsewhere. See al-Tamimi (2017).
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Figure 7. Geographic distribution
By way of contrast, no less than 71% of al-Naba’’s news reports 
focused on operations inside the home wilayat, with 20% related 
to events in the distant wilayat, and only 9% focusing on external 
territories. In view of this, al-Naba’’s coverage was demonstrably 
more caliphate-centric than Rumiyah’s. Not only did its editors spend 
much more time on news relating to the Islamic State heartlands in 
Syria and Iraq, news from the distant wilayat was privileged over that 
from external territories, too. Based on this, it would appear that the 
al-Naba’ editors were shaping their content to be more regionally 
focused, thereby hoping to appeal more to their ‘domestic’ audience.
On balance, the Islamic State according to Rumiyah looks quali-
tatively different to the Islamic State according to al-Naba’. Because 
of the geographic distribution of its content, Rumiyah inevitably 
ended up spending more time discussing covert and terrorist 
operations than did al-Naba’. This is not necessarily just an upshot 
of its tendency to privilege news from outside Iraq and Syria; rather, 
it could perhaps be explained by the fact that the magazine’s editors 
wanted to emphasise a different part of their organisation’s military 
brand – namely, its terrorist endeavours. They privileged reports 
exaggerating the Islamic State’s global reach to such an extent that it 
would appear they were attempting to exert a sort of peer pressure on 
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their readership – by focusing on the incidence of terrorism whenever 
and wherever possible, they amplified the number of attacks that 
were taking place, while at the same time drawing attention to all the 
places where attacks were not taking place. In so doing, they again 
ended up abstracting the idea of jihad, not limiting it to a single 
context or temporality and reminding their readers that it is, at least 
in theory, applicable everywhere and anywhere. The subtext of this 
was clear – it was an implied call-to-arms stating, ‘Your ideological 
co-travellers are fighting for Islamic State and dying in its name all 
over the world – so, reader, why are you not?’
In the context of al-Naba’, the story was markedly different. 
Instead of focusing on news from the distant wilayat and external 
territories, its editors opted to concentrate on Syria and Iraq, appar-
ently hoping to minimise the prospect of territorial defeat, thereby 
emphasising the strategic pain that the Islamic State was causing its 
adversaries. This was especially noticeable with regard to the battle 
for Mosul, during which the al-Naba’ editors doubled down on their 
denialism, attempting to reposition the coalition-backed offensive 
as a strategic trap deliberately set by the group. Even outside of this 
context, they were insistent in their attempts to bolster the percep-
tion of momentum and aggressive potential in Syria and Iraq as the 
proto-state fell apart. In this way, as the territorial caliphate went on 
to haemorrhage over 2017 and 2018, they were able to embrace the 
losses it faced by simply declaring that they were necessary evils on 
the path towards ultimate victory.
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6.  CONCLUSION
A TALE OF TWO CALIPHATES39
This research paper has demonstrated that, at the end of 
2016 at least, the Islamic State communicated in different ways 
with different people, depending on the location and political 
inclination of its target audience. Through comparative analysis of 
two of the organisation’s periodicals – al-Naba’, which is primarily 
aimed at in-theatre consumers, and Rumiyah, which is geared 
towards supporters living outside its direct sphere of operations – 
we have shed light not only on how its propagandists think about 
influence in general, but also about how they understand and 
moderate the interplay between rational and ideological appeals 
in strategic communications in particular. 
As our analysis shows, the two publications were distinct from 
each other in three ways: structurally, they bore only partial resem-
blance to each other, with Rumiyah privileging lengthier, more 
abstract content, and al-Naba’ primarily devoting itself to shorter, 
more tactical news coverage; thematically, they were also distinct, 
with Rumiyah’s content being weighted towards political, social and 
theological issues, and al-Naba’ tending to focus on military matters; 
and geographically, there were important discrepancies between the 
two publications, with Rumiyah spending significantly more time 
discussing events external to Syria and Iraq than did al-Naba’.
These differences suggest that Rumiyah was conceived to per-
form a qualitatively different function to that of al-Naba’. It, as an 
outward-facing electronic magazine, was distinctly more conceptual 
than its in-theatre counterpart. Through its pages, the Islamic State 
jihad was positioned as a rigorously demarcated theo-political 
doctrine and supporters were repeatedly told that knowledge in its 
foundational concepts was paramount. While this line of discourse 
also appeared in al-Naba’, it was heavily diluted – superseded even – 
by the newspaper’s almost myopic focus on current affairs. Indeed, 
according to the pages of al-Naba’, the Islamic State jihad looked and 
felt markedly different: with occasional exceptions, it was positioned 
as a largely conventional war against largely conventional enemies – 
it was less global, and was driven more by practical concerns than 
anything else. To be sure, ideology was present in al-Naba’, but 
it always remained an atmospheric presence. Whereas jihad in 
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Rumiyah was characterised by theoretical idealism, in al-Naba’ it was 
marked by real-world pragmatism. 
Judging by these differences, it would appear that the propagan-
dists were playing to two different crowds with these publications, 
framing the essential qualities of their organisation in different ways 
to different people. Whereas Rumiyah was principally a vehicle for 
ideological instruction and theoretical empowerment, al-Naba’ was 
geared more towards tactical image management – that is, curating 
and maintaining the military brand of the Islamic State. 
A number of implications arise from this analysis, which 
unambiguously demonstrates that the Islamic State is not a mono-
lithic organisation. Indeed, the discrepancies we identify between 
Rumiyah and al-Naba’ are but one facet of this phenomenon. The 
caliphate – and how the caliphate appears through the lens of its 
official propaganda – looks qualitatively different depending on 
the location, language, and political inclination of the ‘consumer’. 
Inside the group’s territories, its strategic communication operations 
are characterised by rational appeals – regular demonstrations of 
strength, stability, and status – that are first and foremost geared 
towards keeping local supporters interested and fighters engaged. 
Externally, though, its political project is positioned differently: the 
appeals are more abstract, and, indeed, its very existence as an organi-
sation is not tied to the conflict in Syria and Iraq – in other words, 
ideology, not war-fighting, takes precedence. 
This observation is highly relevant to policymakers. First, on 
the counter-terrorism side of the equation, it enables us to better 
understand how and why the Islamic State factors ideology into its 
propaganda. The group seemingly wants to create a buffer between 
itself and the real world by striving to re-theorise jihad in the minds 
of its consumers. If this is the case, it demands a different policy 
response from domestic counter-extremism and counter-terrorism 
practitioners. With regard to the other side of the equation – in-coun-
try counter-insurgency and stabilisation policymaking – our findings 
should serve as a word of caution to practitioners hoping to trans-
plant foundational concepts of Western counter-extremism into Iraq 
and Syria. We have shown that even the Islamic State recognises that 
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its in-theatre fighters and supporters – former, current, or future – 
are driven as much by pragmatic concerns as they are by ideological 
fervour, if not more. Researchers would do well to test this thesis in 
the context of other forms of Islamic State propaganda, perhaps by 
comparing and contrasting foreign-language AlHayat Media Center 
videos with Arabic-language content released by the group’s provin-
cial media offices. For that reason, counter- and de-radicalisation 
efforts in the region should not focus on destabilising the ideological 
doctrine of jihad alone, but should also consider the rational and 
practical concerns of those still supporting and fighting for the group.
In any case, our analysis is but one step towards developing a 
better understanding of how and why insurgent and terrorist organi-
sations communicate strategically. Propaganda – how it is conceived 
and to what end it actually operates – remains shrouded in mystique 
and conventional thinking. Cognisant of this, scholars would do well 
to redouble their efforts into meaningfully exploring how, why, and 
when propaganda works, not to mention determining just what it is 
that the word ‘works’ means when used in this context. 
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